Climate Chance Summit in Agadir

Morocco’s concerns about the climate are not fading. After Marrakesh, it is Agadir’s turn to bring together the concerned actors, but this time in the framework of a Summit. Indeed, the city of Agadir will host the 2nd;
WORLD CLIMATE CHANCE SUMMIT FOR NON-STATE ACTORS from September 11 to 13, 2017.

It’s a privilege to participate n’ #ClimateChance 2017, formalising the conversation on;
– reducing the vulnerability of countries to the impacts of climate change by strengthening their resilience adaptation.
– integration of adaptation to the climate change in development policies, programmes and projects as well as in National Budgeting.
– facilitation of access to climate risk transfer for disaster adaptation.
The first one took place in Nantes, this 2nd edition is Moroccan and will measure the progress of the action, To deepen exchanges on successes and difficulties and to foster the pooling of experiences and innovations. Also, this edition will place particular emphasis on the stakes of the African continent and more widely the countries of the South.

 

On this occasion, the organisers stressed: “Almost one year after COP22,  This Summit will be an opportunity to take stock of the agenda of the action and in particular the Marrakesh partnership. It will also be an opportunity to prepare joint messages to be delivered to States at the COP23 as a Follow-up The Nantes Declaration, which remains the most widely signed text by non-state actors. Since the adoption of the Rio Convention on Climate in 1992 “. It should be recalled that the Declaration of Nantes was adopted at the World Summit in September 2016 in Nantes and coordinated by the Climate Chance Association.

 

It has as its motto “Strengthening concrete action to bridge the gap between current commitments and the objective of the Paris Agreement”. The program of this edition consists of three usual pillars of Climate Chance:  There are first the forums to Take stock of COP23 on the actions of the 20 sectoral coalitions (transport, energy, etc.). To these forums are added plenaries, organised in the usual way of Climate Chance. These opening and closing plenaries will address the themes of Financing, the challenge of cities in Africa and migration. The workshops constitute the 3rd pillar. A call for papers was launched on 28 February and remained open until 15 May to decide on the workshops that will enrich the program and make it a moment of sharing and reflection. The selected contributors authorize the Climate Chance Association to reuse and communicate their work.

 

Climate Chance also thought about organising stands, totally free, Where non-state groups and African associations will be represented. The Summit also provided specific events to highlight crafts and local territory.

 

With more than 80 workshops of good practice, which will be presented around 17 themes affecting different sectors and a large participation involving more than 3,000 members, this 2nd edition of the Climate Chance Summit is promising.

 

Source: Libe’ration

#Africa and civil duty-to-respond to emergency programme in case of climatic hazard #UCCEP

Most national governments are initiating governance systems for adaptation. Disaster risk management, adjustments in technologies and infrastructure, ecosystem-based approaches, basic public health measures, and livelihood diversification are reducing vulnerability, although efforts to date tend to be isolated.

Disaster adaptation experience is accumulating across regions in the public and private sector and within communities. Disaster adaptation options adopted to date emphasise incremental adjustments and co-benefits and are starting to emphasise flexibility and learning. Most assessments of disaster adaptation have been restricted to impacts, vulnerability and disaster adaptation planning, with very few assessing the processes of implementation or the effects of disaster adaptation actions.

Future Pathways for Disaster Adaptation and Sustainable Development

Disaster adaptation and resilience are complementary strategies for reducing and managing the disaster risks of climate change. Substantial disaster response programmes and disaster assistance over near time can reduce climate risks in the 21st century and beyond, increase prospects for effective build back better efforts (Building better from start and adopt to the new normal), why build back better is so important to in learning and developing from hazard zones, reduce the costs and challenges of disaster adaptation in the longer term and contribute to climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development.

Disaster preparedness and sustainable development demonstrates the need and strategic considerations for both disaster adaptation and global-scale mitigation to manage risks from climate change. Building on these insights, disaster adaptation near-term response options that could help achieve such strategic goals. Near-term disaster adaptation and resilience actions will differ across sectors and regions, reflecting development status, response capacities and near- and long-term aspirations with regard to both climate and non-climate outcomes. Because disaster adaptation and resilience inevitably take place in the context of multiple objectives, particular attention is given to the ability to develop and implement integrated approaches that can build on co-benefits and manage trade-offs.

Policy approaches for disaster adaptation, technology and finance

Effective disaster adaptation responses will depend on policies and measures across multiple scales: international, regional, national and sub-national. Policies across all scales supporting technology development, diffusion and transfer, as well as finance for responses to climate change law, can complement and enhance the effectiveness of policies that directly promote disaster adaptation.

Institutional dimensions of adaptation governance, including the integration of adaptation into planning and decision-making, play a key role in promoting the transition from planning to implementation of adaptation. Examples of institutional approaches to adaptation involving multiple actors include economic options (e.g., insurance, public-private partnerships), laws and regulations (e.g., land-zoning laws) and national and government policies and programmes (e.g., economic diversification).

A first step towards disaster adaptation to future climate change is reducing vulnerability and exposure to present climate variability, but some near-term responses to climate change may also limit future choices. Integration of adaptation into planning, including policy design, and decision-making can promote synergies with development and disaster risk reduction. However, poor planning or implementation, overemphasising short-term outcomes or failing to sufficiently anticipate consequences can result in maladaptation, increasing the vulnerability or exposure of the target group in the future or the vulnerability of other people, places or sectors. For example, enhanced protection of exposed assets can lock in dependence on further protection measures. Appropriate adaptation options can be better assessed by including co-benefits and mitigation implications.

Co-benefits of disaster adaptation could affect achievement of other objectives, such as those related to energy security, air quality, efforts to address ecosystem impacts, income distribution, labour supply and employment and urban sprawl. In the absence of complementary policies, however, some disaster adaptation measures may have adverse side effects (at least in the short term), for example on biodiversity, food security, energy access, economic growth and income distribution. The co-benefits of disaster adaptation policies may include improved access to infrastructure and services, extended education and health systems, reduced disaster losses, better governance and others.

Comprehensive strategies in response to climate change law that are consistent with sustainable development take into account co-benefits. The assessment of overall social welfare impacts is complicated by this interaction between climate change response options and pre-existing non-climate policies. For example, in terms of air quality, the value of the extra tonne of sulphur dioxide (SO2) reduction that occurs with climate change mitigation through reduced fossil fuel combustion depends greatly on the stringency of SO2 control policies. If SO2 policy is weak, the value of SO2 reductions may be large, but if SO2 policy is stringent, it may be near zero. Similarly, in terms of adaptation and disaster risk management, weak policies can lead to an adaptation deficit that increases human and economic losses from natural climate variability. ‘Adaptation deficit’ refers to the lack of capacity to manage adverse impacts of current climate variability. An existing adaptation deficit increases the benefits of adaptation policies that improve the management of climate variability and change.

Response options for disaster adaptation

Disaster adaptation options exist in all sectors, but their context for implementation and potential to reduce climate-related risks differs across sectors and regions. Significant co-benefits, synergies and trade-offs exist between different disaster adaptation responses; interactions occur both within and across regions and sectors; For example, investments in crop varieties adapted to climate change can increase the capacity to cope with drought, and public health measures to address vector-borne diseases can enhance the capacity of health systems to address other challenges. Similarly, locating infrastructure away from low-lying coastal areas helps settlements and ecosystems adapt to sea level rise while also protecting against tsunamis. However, some disaster adaptation options may have adverse side effects that imply real or perceived trade-offs with other disaster adaptation objectives or broader development goals. For example, while protection of ecosystems can assist disaster adaptation to climate change, increased use of air conditioning to maintain thermal comfort in buildings or the use of desalination to enhance water resource security can increase energy demand.

Disaster adaptation options are not available in every major sector. Disaster adaptation can be more cost-effective if using an integrated approach that combines measures to reduce emergency assistance and enhance long term carbon sinks in land-based sectors (e.g. forest laws to reduce deforestation).

Increasing climate change will increase challenges for many disaster adaptation and resilience options.

Well-designed systemic and cross-sectoral disaster adaptation strategies are more cost-effective in disaster response than a focus on individual technologies and sectors with efforts in one sector affecting the need for disaster adaptation in others.

Institutional dimensions of disaster adaptation governance, including the integration of adaptation into planning and decision-making, play a key role in promoting the transition from planning to implementation of disaster adaptation.

The most commonly emphasized institutional barriers or enablers for adaptation planning and implementation are: 1) multilevel institutional co-ordination between different political and administrative levels in society; 2) key actors, advocates and champions initiating, mainstreaming and sustaining momentum for climate adaptation; 3) horizontal interplay between sectors, actors and policies operating at similar administrative levels; 4) political dimensions in planning and implementation; and 5) coordination between formal governmental, administrative agencies and private sectors and stakeholders to increase efficiency, representation and support for climate adaptation measures

Disaster adaptation measures intersect with other societal goals, creating the possibility of co‐benefits or adverse side‐effects. These intersections, if well‐managed, can strengthen the basis for undertaking climate mitigation actions

Disaster adaptation can positively or negatively influence the achievement of other societal goals, such as those related to human health, food security, biodiversity, local environmental quality, energy access, livelihoods and equitable sustainable development. On the other hand, policies towards other societal goals can influence the achievement of mitigation and other disaster adaptation objectives. These influences can be substantial, although sometimes difficult to quantify, especially in welfare terms. This multi‐objective perspective is important in part because it helps to identify areas where support for policies that advance multiple goals will be robust.

In increasing climate change, will increased disaster adaptation challenges and resilience help reverse the trend and strengthen the basis for undertaking and deliver climate mitigation actions?

Increasing resilience efforts to adapt to climate change law imply an increasing complexity of interactions, encompassing connections among human health, water, energy, land use and biodiversity. Disaster adaptation can support the achievement of other human right goals, such as those related to human health, food security, environmental quality, energy access, livelihoods and sustainable development, although there can also be negative effects. Disaster adaptation and resilience measures also have the potential to undertaking and deliver mitigation co-benefits, and vice versa, and support other societal goals, though trade-offs can also arise.

Overall, the potential for co-benefits for disaster adaptation end-use emergency response measures outweigh the potential for adverse side effects, whereas the evidence suggests this may not be the case for Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) measures.

 

Source: Our Climate Chance summary and integrated view on policy sectoral co-benefits relate to disaster risk law in the final part of the IPCC’s Key Findings – Fifth Assessment Report

#Goal11 City Levels Green, Amber or even Red

#Goal11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

Today, more than half of the world’s population lives in urban areas. It is thus incumbent upon states and societies to foster policies that help make cities and human settlements more inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable, as SDG number eleven states. In this cross-national comparison we look at two aspects that can be ascribed to this complex and multidimensional goal.

11_1

Click on the picture to enlarge

The first indicator refers to air pollution and potential health stresses caused by high particulate matter concentrations. Figure 11.1 shows the respective proportion of the population whose exposure to “PM2.5” is above the WHO threshold of 15 micrograms per cubic meter. In 17 OECD member states, including several small countries such as Estonia, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Slovenia, but also some large countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, the population is on average not exposed to particulate matter concentrations exceeding this threshold. However, in the other half of the OECD nations, the picture looks different. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Belgium, for instance, more than 50 percent of the population is on average exposed to particulate matter levels above the threshold. These three countries lag farthest behind. And also countries such as Germany (25 percent of the population), Switzerland (28 percent), the Netherlands (32 percent), Austria (32 percent), and Italy (35 percent) still have some catching up to do.

11_2

Click on the picture to enlarge

The second indicator used here and portrayed in figure 11.2 refers to potential overcrowding as measured by the average number of rooms in a dwelling per person. The indicator thus Today, more than half of the world’s population lives in urban areas. It is thus incumbent upon states and societies to foster policies that help make cities and human settlements more inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable, as SDG number eleven states. In this cross-national comparison we look at two aspects that can be ascribed to this complex and multidimensional goal. The first indicator refers to air pollution and potential health stresses caused by high particulate matter concentrations. Figure 11.1 shows the respective proportion of the population whose exposure to “PM2.5” is above the WHO threshold of 15 micrograms per cubic meter. In 17 OECD member states, including several small countries such as Estonia, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Slovenia, but also some large countries such Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable 11.1 Particulate matter provides some information on housing conditions in terms of space. The top five countries in this respect are Canada, New Zealand, the United States, Australia, and Belgium, where the respective room per person ratio is between 2.3 and 2.5. The midfi eld comprises a number of countries with on average 1.6 to 1.8 rooms per person. Countries such as Japan, Germany, France, Sweden, Austria, Portugal, and Switzerland belong to this group. At the bottom of the league table, however, we find several countries where a person has – on average – only one room at his or her disposal: Mexico (1.0), Turkey, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary (all 1.1).

Further indicators which could be relevant to this goal include, but are not limited to, widespread access to public transport or the number of people killed in road accidents. These domains are particularly relevant outside the OECD nations since 90 percent of global road deaths, for instance, occur in low- and middle-income countries.

 

Source: SDG Index and Dashboards – Global Report

First glance at the Zero Draft New Urban Agenda 18 June

Extract from Zero Draft New Urban Agenda #NUA #NuevaAgendaUrbana
#AgendaBaruPerkotaan #NouvelAgendaUrbain #Новая повестка дня городского развития

By the year 2050, the world urban population is expected to nearly double, posing massive sustainability challenges in terms of housing, infrastructure, basic services, and jobs among others. There is a need to address the way cities and human settlements are planned, developed, governed and managed.

“32. We commit to recognise the working poor in the informal economy as contributors and legitimate actors of the urban economies, including the unpaid and domestic workers. A gradual approach to formalisation will be developed to preserve and enhance informal livelihoods while extending access to legal and social protections, as well as support services to the informal workforce.”

“52. We commit to facilitate and support urban development in a manner that preserves rapidly diminishing natural resources, protects and improves the urban ecosystem and environmental services, promotes disaster risk reduction, while promoting sustainable economic development and people’s well-being, through environmentally sound planning, infrastructure and basic services, enhancing the quality of life of the inhabitants.”

“53. We commit to promote the creation of well-connected and well-distributed networks of open, multipurpose, safe and green public spaces, including the creation of ecological corridors, to improve the resilience of cities to disasters and climate change, reducing flood risks and heat waves, and improving food security and nutrition, physical and mental health, household and ambient air quality, and attractive and liveable urban landscapes.”

“64. We commit to shift from reactive to more proactive risk-based, all-hazards and all-of-society approaches, while also ensuring timely and effective local disaster response to address the immediate needs of inhabitants following a disaster, as well as the integration of the ‘’Build Back Better’’ principles in the post-disaster recovery process to integrate the lessons from past disasters into future planning and resilience-building measures.”

“77. We will encourage applying the principle of subsidiarity in the implementation of national housing policies through subnational and decentralized structures in order to ensure the coherence between national and local urban development strategies, land policies, and housing supply.”

“121. We will support access to different multilateral funds, including the Green Climate Fund, for cities to secure resources for climate change adaptation and mitigation plans, policies, programmes and actions. We will collaborate with local financial institutions to develop climate finance infrastructure solutions and to create appropriate mechanisms to identify catalytic financial instruments. We will collaborate with national and international insurance and reinsurance institutions to develop feasible solutions for future climate risks in cities, with regard to investments in urban infrastructures, urban assets as well as for local populations to secure their shelter and economic needs.”

“129. We will strengthen cooperation between sub-national and local governments and civil society as well as their existing networks to deliver on capacity development programmes by means of peer-to-peer learning, subject-matter related partnerships, and collaborative action such as inter-municipal cooperation, including the establishment of practitioners’ networks and other science-policy interface mechanisms.”

“133. We will support institutionalized mechanisms for sharing and exchanging information, knowledge and expertise, including the collection, analysis and dissemination of geographically-based, community-collected and disaggregated data by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national and local contexts, as well as ensuring a robust science-policy interface in urban policy formulation.”

“136. We will foster the creation, promotion, and enhancement of open and participatory data platforms using technological and social tools available to transfer and share knowledge among national, sub-national, and local governments and other stakeholders, including non-state actors and people to enhance effective urban planning and management, efficiency, and transparency through e-governance, ICT-assisted approaches.”

 

Source: revised Zero Draft